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Rights-based approaches are potentially promising tools to meet conservation
objectives in natural resource management. Here, we evaluated how popula-
tion status and ﬁshery production respond to catch shares, a rights-based pol-
icy instrument in ﬁsheries whereby participants are granted a right to harvest
a fraction of the allowable catch. By analyzing time series of landings, exploita-
tion rate, and population biomass for >150 ﬁsheries, we ﬁnd that catch shares
tended to dampen variance in ﬁshery landings and exploitation rate, that they
had no effect on population biomass, and that the responses were unrelated
to population status prior to catch shares. Variance dampening was strongest
when harvesting rights were durable and secure but was absent otherwise.
Reductions in exploitation rate were strongest in multispecies ﬁsheries with
high levels of at-sea observers. Although beneﬁts are not guaranteed, success-
ful catch share programs share common elements that can be incorporated in
the design of future programs.
Introduction
Environmental degradation of common-pool natural
resources—rangelands, forests, and ﬁsheries—is com-
monly attributed to weak or poorly deﬁned property
rights. In the absence of well-deﬁned access or ownership
rights, short-term interests take precedence over long-
term sustainability, leading to actions that erode the pro-
ductive capacity of ecosystems (Hardin 1968). Although
it is clear that property rights are not always necessary
(Ostrom et al. 1999) and are not sufﬁcient to ensure long-
term sustainability (references in Crow et al. 2008), there
is a growing emphasis in conservation biology and man-
agement to strengthen and clarify property rights as a
way to align long-term ecological and conservation goals
with individual economic interests (Hanna et al. 1996;
Berkes et al. 2006). Rights-based approaches are repre-
sentative of a broader class of market-based policy in-
struments (e.g., certiﬁcation, pollution taxes, and cap-
and-trade programs) that provide economic incentives to
meet ecological goals and promote innovation to that end
(Stavins 2003; Costello et al. 2010).
Marine ﬁsheries are one of the most pervasive an-
thropogenic disturbances impacting marine ecosystems
(Halpern et al. 2008). Conventional “command and con-
trol” management measures may have limited success in
meeting ecological goals because of increases in ﬁshing
capacity through technological innovation, the tendency
to make risk-prone policy decisions to protect short-term
interests, and unanticipated changes in ﬁshing behavior
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in response to regulations (Degnbol & McCay 2006;
Beddington et al. 2007). Rights-based instruments may
be more effective if they better align users’ economic in-
centives with environmental goals for resource manage-
ment (Hilborn et al. 2005; Fujita & Bonzon 2006; Costello
et al. 2010). In ﬁsheries, rights-based systems are those in
which speciﬁc harvest or access rights are granted to in-
dividuals or groups (e.g., ﬁsher organizations or coopera-
tives). When harvest rights are speciﬁed in terms of a frac-
tion of the allowable catch, these systems are often called
“catch shares,” and have been identiﬁed as a promising
tool to end the pattern of ﬁshery development that leads
to resource degradation (Fujita et al. 1998; Grafton et al.
2006; Beddington et al. 2007; Worm et al. 2009).
There is growing evidence that catch shares have de-
tectable impacts on marine living resources and ecosys-
tems. One beneﬁt of catch shares is that they eliminate
perverse incentives leading to a race-to-ﬁsh, whereby in-
dividuals compete to capture the highest possible fraction
of the quota (Copes 1986). This activity leads to high rates
of discarded catch, higher incidental catch of nontarget
species, and potential habitat degradation (Sutinen 1999;
Branch 2009). Catch share ﬁsheries are less likely to ex-
perience a collapse in landings (Costello et al. 2008) or to
have excessive overﬁshing (Melnychuk et al. 2012), and
they lead to better compliance with catch limits (Branch
2009; Melnychuk et al. 2012). However, Essington (2010)
found that catch shares had a pronounced dampening
effect on the interannual variance of ecological metrics
in North American ﬁsheries, but had little effect on the
mean levels of most metrics. Similarly, Melnychuk et al.
(2012) did not ﬁnd evidence that catch shares were, on
average, closer to their management targets than other
ﬁsheries. Thus, there remains considerable uncertainty
regarding the type and extent of conservation beneﬁts
that catch shares produce and the types of ﬁshery systems
where these effects are most pronounced.
Speciﬁc attributes of catch share programs might be
particularly important in dictating their effect on the pop-
ulation status of exploited resources. Indeed, there is a
growing appreciation that policy instruments must be
designed to match the ecological, economic, and social
systems in which they are implemented (Ostrom 2007,
2009). In ﬁsheries, we might expect different responses
between single- and multispecies ﬁsheries because of the
greater management challenges that the latter commonly
face (Murawski 1991), especially with respect to match-
ing catches to quotas (Sanchirico et al. 2006; Branch
& Hilborn 2008). Attention has also been given to the
strength of harvesting (or property) rights as a proxy
for the ecological stewardship incentive that they are
thought to provide (Hanna et al. 1996; Arnason 2005), so
that substantial effects should be associated with strong
and clear harvesting rights. Alternatively, effects of catch
shares may not result from the allocation of rights per
se, but instead from other changes in ﬁsheries that ac-
company their implementation. For example, Bromley
(2009) argued that the beneﬁt of catch shares may de-
rive from the use of strict catch quotas to limit ﬁshing
mortality. If true, then catch shares should have little ef-
fect where quotas are already in place. Implementation of
catch shares may also be accompanied by improved mon-
itoring and enforcement, such as at-sea or dockside ob-
servers producing more accurate and rapid data on catch
and catch composition.
Here, we conducted the ﬁrst large-scale analysis of
catch shares that measured the changes in key popula-
tion and ﬁshery metrics following catch share implemen-
tation and to related these responses to attributes of catch
shares and ﬁsheries. Speciﬁcally, we evaluated changes
in exploitation rate (the fraction of ﬁsh harvested annu-
ally), population or stock biomass, and total landed catch
(“landings”) across a broad range of ﬁsheries from around
the world, using a variety of system attributes as covari-
ates. Following Essington (2010), we evaluated changes
in the mean levels of these indicators as well changes in
the interannual variability that follows catch share im-
plementation. This paper provides the most comprehen-
sive analysis to date of how implementing catch shares
affects the status of ﬁshed populations and identiﬁes the
attributes of ﬁshery and catch shares that make effects
more pronounced.
Methods
We conducted a comparative analysis using a diverse data
set to identify response of landings, exploitation rate,
and population biomass to catch share implementation.
These are the most commonly and consistently reported
metrics in ﬁsheries, and include the two primary mea-
sures of population status: exploitation rate and popu-
lation biomass. Landings provide a measure of the pro-
ductive capacity of the ﬁshery. Other ecologically rele-
vant information—total ﬁshing effort, unretained catch
(discard), and bycatch (incidental capture of nontarget
species)—were not available for most ﬁsheries. Here,
we describe the data used for analysis and provide an
overview of the statistical procedures.
All time-series data were obtained from the RAM
legacy database (Ricard et al. 2012), which is the most
extensive database of stock assessments (i.e., popula-
tion models used to estimate time series of biomass
and exploitation rate) presently available. Data pre-
dominantly are composed of commercial ﬁsheries from
Australia, New Zealand, USA, Canada, and Europe, but
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stock assessments from developing countries were also
included where available. These data included 84 catch
share and 140 reference ﬁsheries (Table S1). Data on
catch share program attributes were collected via tele-
phone or e-mail interviews with experts from each ﬁsh-
ery (see Supporting Information).
Our analysis was designed to describe changes in ﬁsh-
ery time series coinciding with the implementation of
catch shares, while accounting for other time-dependent
trends in the response variables. We did not ﬁt a mecha-
nistic model of stock and ﬂeet dynamics, but instead em-
ployed a general statistical model to estimate changes in
ﬁsheries when catch shares are introduced. It is designed
to answer the question: do population sizes, exploitation
rate, and landings have a different mean level or degree of
variability after catch shares compared to time-dependent
trends in other ﬁsheries.
We provide details of the model and estimation pro-
cedure in the Supporting Information, but here iden-
tify the key characteristics. First, the model explicitly in-
cludes temporal autocorrelation in the time series while
describing changes in the mean and variance through
time through a modiﬁed version of the method used by
Essington (2010). Second, the model includes both catch
share and reference ﬁsheries to track the time-dependent
changes in the absence of catch shares and to identify
changes unique to catch share ﬁsheries. Third, we ac-
count for interdependence of responses among ﬁsheries
operating within the same regions via a multilevel frame-
work. Fourth, we relate average catch share effects within
a region to characteristics of ﬁsheries and catch share pro-
grams within those regions. Fifth, effects of catch shares
are estimated as log-response rations to allow for com-
parison of responses across ﬁsheries and regions.
A key feature of our analysis is that we compare time-
dependent changes in catch share ﬁsheries in each re-
gion to ensembles of reference ﬁsheries using a multilevel
framework (Gelman & Hill 2007). The multilevel frame-
work allowed us to (1) estimate regional-scale average
effects of catch shares on ﬁsheries and to determine how
these are related to ﬁshery and catch share attributes and
(2) estimate time-dependent changes in ﬁshery time se-
ries unrelated to catch shares by describing changes in the
mean and standard deviation within and across regions.
The multilevel structure means that the individual ﬁsh-
ery effect sizes are presumed to be draws from a regional-
scale distribution of effect sizes; the nested structure of
the analysis allowed us to estimate effects at the scales of
individual ﬁsheries as well as average effects within re-
gions. Regions were speciﬁed based on nations and ocean
to account for large-scale differences in population sta-
tus induced by climatic variability as well as other poli-
cies instituted by regional ﬁsheries management organi-
zations. Management of ﬁsheries in most of these regions
is overseen by a single nation, though some regions com-
bined ﬁsheries from several nations (Europe, where ma-
rine ﬁsheries are jointly managed under the Common
Fisheries Policy, and South America). Because attributes
of catch share programs and ﬁsheries tended to be simi-
lar among ﬁsheries within a region, we focused on effects
that were manifest at the regional scale; that is, how do
average effects of catch shares in one region compare to
other regions?
We evaluated how the effect of catch shares varied ac-
cording to several covariates hypothesized to be impor-
tant. To this end, our estimation procedure explicitly con-
sidered the extent to which regional-scale catch share
effects were linearly related to each covariate (see Sup-
porting Information). We considered several measures
of the strength of harvesting right: exclusivity, durabil-
ity/security, and transferability, but found there was in-
sufﬁcient contrast in transferability among regions to per-
mit analysis of this covariate. Exclusivity was measured as
the proportion of catch in a ﬁshery that was allocated to a
catch share program. Durability/security were binary re-
sponses (yes/no) that covaried completely (durability is
the longevity of the harvesting right, security is the like-
lihood of a harvesting right being realized), so we evalu-
ated them as a single response. We also tested whether
catch share effects were weaker in ﬁsheries that were
managed via catch quotas prior to catch share implemen-
tation, that is, we tested whether the primary beneﬁt was
the quota. In addition, we tested whether the response to
catch shares was related to the degree of at-sea observer
coverage, the change in levels of at-sea observer cover-
age that accompanied catch shares, the degree of indus-
try participation in developing the catch share program,
and whether the ﬁshery was primarily a single-species or
a multispecies ﬁshery. The latter could be more respon-
sive if catch shares improve the ability to match catches
to quotas in multispecies ﬁsheries.
Results
Catch shares induced a diversity of responses in ﬁsheries
(Figure 1; see also Figures S1–S3). To illustrate what com-
monly observed effect sizes imply about dynamics of ﬁsh-
ery time series, we plotted the predicted mean and 90%
posterior prediction range for three exploitation rate time
series, where exploitation = fraction of biomass caught
annually (Figure 1). Petrale sole in British Columbia,
Canada, exhibited a strong response in both the mean
and standard deviation in exploitation rate, both of
which decreased markedly following catch share imple-
mentation. Southeast Australia school whiting showed a
Conservation Letters 00 (2012) 1–10 Copyright and Photocopying: c  2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 3Catch shares and ecological stewardship T.E. Essington et al.
Figure 1 Threetypesofresponsestocatchshareimplementation.Eachpaneldepictsthetimeseriesofexploitationrate(standardizedsothateachtime
serieshasamean=1;solidpoints),theﬁttedmeanvalues(inEq.1–2:solidline)andthe90%posteriorpredictioninterval(grayarea).(A)BritishColumbia
petrale sole; (B) Southeast Australia school whiting; (C) New Zealand red rock lobster. Year = 0 represents the year of catch share implementation.
Table 1 Summary of individual ﬁshery responses to catch share imple-
mentation; each table entry lists the number of ﬁsheries for which there
was a signiﬁcant change in the time-series standard deviation or mean;
signiﬁcance was based on 90% posterior probability credibility intervals;




No. of No. of No. of No. of
increase decrease increase decrease
Landings (51) 3 17 0 3
Exploitation Rate (54) 2 14 0 7
Biomass (54) 8 12 1 2
decrease in standard deviation but no change in the mean
exploitation rate, whereas New Zealand red rock lobster
(stock = CRA2) exhibited reduced mean exploitation rate
but no change in standard deviation.
Despite variation in individual ﬁshery responses, we
detected some notable patterns. For all three metrics
(biomass, exploitation rate, and landings), we found
stronger effect of catch shares on interannual variabil-
ity than on the mean (Table 1). For example, the mean
landings signiﬁcantly (P > 90%) changed in only three
ﬁsheries, but interannual standard deviation signiﬁcantly
changed after catch share implementation in 20 ﬁsheries.
For landings and exploitation rates, the response tended
to be negative, that is, signiﬁcant effects were associated
with a decline in either the mean or standard deviation
(Table 1). In contrast, the direction of response of popula-
tion biomass was less consistent, exhibiting both positive
and negative effects (Table 1).
We evaluated whether the small responses of mean ex-
ploitation rate and population biomass might be due to
these metrics being already close to values that maximize
landings (i.e., maximum sustained yield, MSY: exploita-
tion rate = FMSY, population biomass = BMSY). If this was
true, then the ﬁtted response (catch share effect plus the
regional average time trend, see Supporting Information)
should be related to the ratio of F:FMSY and B:BMSY prior
to catch share implementation. Contrary to the expecta-
tion, the ﬁtted response did not show a strong relation-
ship to precatch share conditions (here, averaged over
the 5 years prior to catch share implementation, though
similar results were obtained by using the entire precatch
share period; Figure 2). This result was particularly strik-
ing for population biomass, where the majority of stocks
had B:BMSY <1, yet many populations exhibited declines
in biomass after catch share implementation (Figure 2).
The regional-scale average effect sizes were most pro-
nounced for landings and exploitation rate, whereas
there was little evidence of regional-scale effects for pop-
ulation biomass (Figure 3). For both landings and ex-
ploitation rate, the effect of catch shares on the mean
and standard deviation tended to be negative, and no
region had an effect size that was signiﬁcantly greater
than zero. For landings, we estimated signiﬁcant reduc-
tions (>90% probability) in both mean and standard de-
viation for three regions and a signiﬁcant reduction in
the mean only in one region. Overall, the grand average
(integrating over all regions) effect indicated a signiﬁcant
decline in mean landings (i.e., a negative log-response ra-
tio; P(<0) = 93%), equating to a roughly 10% reduction
in landings after catch share implementation. Although
the grand average effect on the standard deviation of
landings was stronger (ca. 14% reduction), the estimate
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Figure 2 Comparisonofprecatchshareexploitationratesandpopulation
biomass levels relative to those that produce maximum sustainable yield
(F:FMSY,B : B MSY), and the estimated change in these metrics. If ﬁsheries
perfectly compensate by moving to FMSY or BMSY after catch shares were
introduced, all points would reside on the dotted line. Fitted response in-
cludesthecatchshareeffectaswellastheregional-scaletime-dependent
trend. Points are posterior means, gray lines are 50% posterior credibility
intervals.
Figure 3 Regional mean effect sizes of catch shares on landings, ex-
ploitationrate,andbiomass.Solidcirclesdenoteeffectonthetime-series
means, empty circles denote effects on the time-series standard devia-
tion. Symbols are the posterior mean effect sizes, lines are 90% posterior
credibility intervals. The ﬁnal row indicates the average effect size that in-
tegrates over all regional effects. See Supporting Information for speciﬁc
details on hierarchical analysis.
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Table 2 Summary of regional ﬁshery attributes for catch share ﬁsheries. Data were not obtained for most European ﬁsheries so are not presented here
No. of catch At sea
share ﬁsheries Single observer Quota Industry
in analysis Exclusivitya Durabilityb Transferableb Speciesc coveraged managemente involvemente
Australia 5 0.96 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.02 0.4 0.6
Can. Atlantic 7 0.93 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.17 0.7 0.9
Can. Paciﬁc 10 0.92 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.77 1 0.9
New Zealand 17 (0) 0.85 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.05 0.05 0
S. Africa 2 1.00 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.50 1 0
S. America 3f 0.76 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.05 1 0
U.S. Atlantic 2 0.97 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.02 1 1
U.S. Paciﬁc 3 0.87 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.41 1 1
aAverage proportion of catch allocated to catch share sectors.
bProportion of catch share ﬁsheries in each region classiﬁed as durable or transferable.
cProportion of stocks that were ﬁshed primarily as part of single-species ﬁsheries.
dAverage proportion of trips that were covered by at-sea observers, averaged over all ﬁsheries.
eProportion of stocks that used quota management prior to catch share implementation, or the proportion of stocks in which the ﬁshing industry
advocated for and were involved in developing catch share program.
fAttribute data available for two ﬁsheries.
was less precise so the probability that this value was <0
was smaller (82%). For exploitation rates, no region ex-
hibited a signiﬁcant decline in the mean, but the standard
deviation declined signiﬁcantly in four regions (Figure 3).
The grand average of the regional effects indicated a sig-
niﬁcant reduction in the standard deviation of exploita-
tion rates (20% reduction, P(<0) = 95%), but no signif-
icant effect on the mean (P(<0) = 82%). The absence of
regional scale effects on biomass is primarily attributed
the absence of consistent effects across ﬁsheries within
regions (Figure S3), and also on the reduced statistical
power caused by high temporal autocorrelation (Support-
ing Information contains additional evaluation of biomass
responses).
There were notable differences among regions in the
strength of harvesting rights and other ﬁshery attributes
(Table 2). Durability/security varied substantially across
regions, whereas exclusivity tended to be high (>75%
catch allocated to catch share sectors) across all regions.
Only two catch share ﬁsheries were not transferable (in-
season or across seasons), which made the regional scores
of this attribute nearly equivalent to each other. Other
ﬁshery attributes varied among regions more strongly.
The proportion of each region’s catch share ﬁsheries that
primarily targeted a single species, the extent of at-sea ob-
server coverage, and industry participation in establish-
ing catch shares varied widely across regions (Table 2).
In most regions, catch shares were introduced to ﬁsheries
that already used catch quotas (Table 2).
We detected a marginally signiﬁcant relationship be-
tween the durability/security of catch shares and the
degree of variance dampening (Figure 4). For landings,
catch shares produced no effect in regions where catch
shares were not durable/secure, but produced a 50% re-
duction in interannual variability when all catch shares
within a region were durable/secure (Figure 5A). A
slightly weaker relationship was observed for exploita-
tion rate: variance dampening was pronounced in regions
with durable/secure catch share programs, but had no ef-
fect in regions lacking these attributes (Figures 4 and 5B).
The coefﬁcients describing the effect of exclusivity were
poorly estimated (Figure 4), reﬂecting the limited con-
trast in regional exclusivity scores.
The effect of catch shares on mean exploitation rate
was associated with two ﬁshery attributes (Figure 4). A
signiﬁcantly larger decrease in mean exploitation rate
was estimated for regions that had higher at-sea observer
coverage and higher proportion of multispecies ﬁsheries
(Figures 5C and D). These two predictor variables covar-
ied strongly, which explains why their correlations with
catch share effects were similar. There was no discern-
able effect of prior quota control management, degree of
industry involvement, or change in at-sea observer cov-
erage level on any response (Figure 4).
Discussion
This study contributes to a growing body of research
that aims to relate governance and other facets of so-
cial systems to the status of ecological systems (Degn-
bol & McCay 2006; Liu et al. 2007; Carpenter et al. 2009;
Ostrom 2009; Guti´ errez et al. 2011). Our analysis used
high-quality data sets from ﬁsheries from around the
world to document the types and magnitudes of effects
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Figure 4 Estimatedcoefﬁcients(mean,90%credibilityinterval)relatingeffectofcatchsharestoregionalﬁsheryattributes.Effectsize=0meansthatthe
regional average responses to catch shares were unrelated to the attribute. Solid circles denote effect on the time-series means, empty circles denote
effects on the time-series standard deviation.
Figure 5 Fitted relationships between catch share effects and ﬁshery at-
tributes(forthesigniﬁcanteffectsobservedinFig.4).Toptwopanelsshow
themagnitudeofvariancedampeningforlandings(A)andexploitationrate
(B) as explained by the proportion of ﬁsheries deemed durable/secure.
Bottom two panels show the catch share effects on mean exploitation
rate as function of degree of observer coverage (C) or the proportion of
stocks ﬁshed in single species ﬁsheries (D). Points are the ﬁtted regional
coefﬁcients, solid lines are posterior means, and the dotted lines are 90%
credibility intervals.
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that rights-based policy instruments produce and to iden-
tify elements of ﬁshery systems that amplify or diminish
these effects. We conﬁrmed and generalized the results
of Essington (2010), ﬁnding that catch shares primar-
ily act to dampen variability, but we also demonstrated
that variance dampening is only present when the access
right is durable and secure. We also ﬁnd that, on average,
catch shares are followed by reductions in exploitation
rate in multispecies ﬁsheries with high at-sea observer
coverage. This work thereby substantially advances our
understanding of the effects of rights-based approaches
so that the conservation beneﬁts of implementing novel
programs can be better anticipated.
The prediction that rights-based approaches might fos-
ter ecological stewardship stems from the idea that rights
better align participants economic incentives with eco-
logical goals (Grafton et al. 2006). We had therefore ex-
pected that catch shares would result in reductions in
exploitation rate and increases in population biomass
when these population metrics were too high (exploita-
tion rate) or too low (population biomass) before the new
management strategy was introduced, relative to levels
that would maximize catch. This expectation was not
borne out—there was little to no relationship between
catch share effects and the ratios F:FMSY or B:BMSY.A l -
though harvest rates tended to decrease after implement-
ing catch shares, the response was generally too weak
to eliminate overﬁshing. This ﬁnding is consistent with
that of Melnychuk et al. (2012) who found that mean ra-
tios of F:FMSY and B:BMSY did not differ between catch
share and competitive quota-managed ﬁsheries. By re-
lating changes in individual ﬁsheries to population sta-
tus as we have done here strengthens the ﬁnding of
Melnychuk et al. (2012) because it reduced the potential
bias and confounding effects that may be present in cross-
ﬁsheries comparisons. We conclude that many of the ele-
ments of the ﬁshing system—including the economic and
social systems—that promoted overexploitation prior to
catch shares largely persisted after catch shares were im-
plemented (Clark 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999; Grafton et al.
2007).
There are at least two explanations for the variance
dampening effect of access rights in ﬁsheries. One, vari-
ance dampening might result from ending the race-to-
ﬁsh (Sutinen 1999). When ﬁshing ﬂeets are not compet-
ing to catch the greatest share of the annual catch limit,
the catch is taken at a slower pace and might therefore
be better monitored and controlled within ﬁshing sea-
sons. There is strong evidence that catch shares improve
quota balancing in multispecies ﬁsheries (Sanchirico et al.
2006; Branch 2009), partly by slowing the pace of ﬁsh-
ing throughout the ﬁshing season. Two, the probability
that exploitation rates greatly exceed management tar-
gets in a given year is lower in catch share ﬁsheries (Mel-
nychuk et al. 2012). These periods of high exploitation
rates can diminish population productivity and require
future reductions in exploitation rate and catch levels to
rebuild populations. By avoiding these periods of overex-
ploitation, landings and exploitation rates can better be
maintained at constant levels. The British Columbia pe-
trale sole ﬁshery (Figure 1) provides an example of both
cyclical (precatch share) and steady (postcatch share)
dynamics.
Our results suggest that this variance dampening ef-
fect depends on having durable and secure access rights.
There was essentially no variance dampening in regions
with nondurable/insecure harvesting rights, whereas the
dampening was strong in regions with durable and
secure rights. Theory suggests that durable and secure ac-
cess rights promote decision making that maximizes long-
term proﬁtability and avoids short-term resource degra-
dation (Deacon 1994). Durable and secure access might
promote industry investment in research that improves
the precision of stock assessments that are used to esti-
mate annual catch limits (Branch 2009). Also, owners of
durable/secure access rights may be less risk-prone and
advocate for lower catch levels in the face of uncertain
stock status (Branch 2009).
We applied a novel method to estimate impacts of a
policy intervention that used ensembles of reference time
series to tease apart effects attributable to a policy change
from other confounding effects. This approach may be
useful for future policy analyses, as it obviates the need to
identify closely matched pairs of systems as a way to deal
with the counterfactual (the change that would have oc-
curred in catch share ﬁsheries had catch shares not been
implemented). In the present application, this ensemble-
based comparative approach was critical, as the analysis
revealed substantial time-dependent trends in nearly all
metrics (Figure S4).
This work advances our understanding of how rights-
based approaches may contribute to meeting ecological
goals in natural resource management. The nature of re-
sponses to rights-based approaches in ﬁsheries (variance
dampening) appears to be fundamentally different from
those in terrestrial systems, where property rights have
been linked to reduced deforestation rates (Deacon 1994;
Nelson et al. 2001). Moreover, ecological responses varied
across regions, apparently related to the strength of ac-
cess right and other attributes of the ﬁshery system. Thus,
application of rights-based policy tools should be accom-
panied by a consideration of the types of responses that
they are likely to produce and the socioecological context
where these responses are strongest.
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